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ABSTRACT This paper focuses on explaining “the disappearance of politics” from public space 
roughly a quarter century after the Velvet Revolution. From the perspective of the history of ideas it 
clarifies several terms, such as “apolitics”, “anti-politics”, “non-political politics” and “sub-politics,” all 
of which are often used interchangeably in the contemporary Czech political discourse. It outlines the 
different origins and development of these terms, and how they have been applied in the past. It also shows 
the relationship between these terms and the issue of forming “civil society”, as well as their role in “party 
democracy” and their current presence in the execution of political power in post-Communist countries. 
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MOTTO:
The leaders’ baffling and reason-defying incongruity prompts the baffled, disheartened and 
dispirited “ordinary folks” to turn their backs on and avert their eyes from Politics with 
a capital “P”, and to thereby allow its practitioners to get away with their game of false pre-
tences and promises to square the circles and to reconcile the irreconcilabilities. The most 
effective prescription for grinding communication to a halt and for preventing its resumption 
is, after all, to rob it of the presumption and expectation of meaningfulness and sense. No lon-
ger can one placate one’s fears and premonitions by blaming the rising anxieties about the 
future of democracy either on the art of hypocrisy in which the political elite have become 
grandmasters, or on their ineptitude coupled with personal dishonesty and corruption
Zygmunt Bauman
Terms such as “apolitics”, “anti-politics”, “non-political politics” and “sub-politics”, which 
I would like to discuss in this paper from the perspective of the “history of ideas” (or 
more precisely the sociology of knowledge), are today often used interchangeably, or even 
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1 For some of the ideas contained in the analysis of “anti-politics” and the ANO movement I am 
grateful to K. Müller, Jr. from our joint article for the Hospodářské noviny blog.
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promiscuously,2 and therefore prevent a deeper analysis of important historical-political phe-
nomena and social processes from the near-distant past, as well as in part those from the pres-
ent. An overview and clarification of these concepts and an attempt to differentiate what they 
entail, both genetically and systematically, seems to be an important part of, or even a pre-
condition for, more accurately identification of the frequently asked question today “Where 
have politics disappeared?”, whether or not we understand this “disappearance” as the grad-
ual decline of the social functions of politics, as a “relocation” of its core, or as a new “func-
tional differentiation” (Niklas Luhmann) of the entire social system. 
On the genesis and development of the problem
Since the end of World War I, we have witnessed great changes in what the term “the politi-
cal” – that is, everything that traditionally belongs to the sphere of politics3 – entails: the auto-
cratic-theocratic state forms of empire and tsarism that dominated politics and power, which 
had earlier been considered a given, ceased to exist (in this regard Tomáš G. Masaryk char-
acterized this situation as a world revolution in his book of the same name [Masaryk 1925]). 
New political and social “dispositives”4 emerged and spread worldwide, which with varying 
significance and in changing form held sway throughout the entire “short twentieth century” 
(E. Hobsbawm), and included the homogeni zation of the previously clearly stratified social 
structure of classical bourgeoisie society, whose vertical layering had throughout the nine-
teenth century settled along the axis of wealth and competences, into – in its own way – an 
“uncertain, unsure, and anonymized” (K. Heiden), a revolting (J. Ortega y Gasset), and above 
all a “mass society” with ambiguous interests (E. Lederer). As Hannah Arendt demonstrated, 
questions of mobilizing the masses with worldviews came to the forefront, in the sense of 
both their perspectives and the roles of their leaders. This was accompanied by the effects of 
the radicalizing “war experience” (E. Jünger, T. de Chardin), the “Americanization of culture” 
2 I am of course aware that in politics in practice, phenomena, which are labelled with these “ideally 
typically” construed terms, are always hybrid in nature. But because we want to understand and 
compare them, it is necessary to defi ne as precisely as possible just what they entail. 
3 In regards to the alleged “disappearance of politics”, it is necessary to focus attention away from 
the frequently raised, and usually one-sided, questions of political “power” (Macht) and forms of 
its execution, and instead concentrate more on the issue of Herrschaft – that is, ideas about how 
political life is organized, about the possibilities and forms of advocating and realizing specifi c 
cultural, social, and economic interests under the conditions of actual political regimes, or more 
precisely, in actual political systems.
4 Michel Foucault introduced the term dispositive in the late 1960s and early 1970s as he transitioned 
from the concept of the archaeology of knowledge to genealogy. He used the term with three 
meanings: First, to refer to a network of relationships, created in a certain time and place, between 
individual discourses, institutions, laws, political actors, administrative measures, regulatory deci-
sions, philosophical principles, and so on and acting as a heterogeneous unit. Second, it serves as 
a dominant strategic orientation for dealing with emerging situations. Third, it acts as a unifying 
platform, which justifi es certain practices and enables entrance into a new fi eld of rationality 
( Foucault 2004).
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(jazz, slapstick films, dance, fashion), the establishment of different generational cohorts with 
differing political, social, and economic experience and with differing interests, the emergence 
of post-war calls for gender equality, growth in the significance of organizing and legitimizing 
ideologies, the transition from professional parties to ideological parties, and so on.
Already in the 1920s Max Weber could sense social phenomena such as the breaking 
away of the private sphere, lowered interest in public affairs, the personalization of poli-
tics, the uprooting of social interests, and growing tension between political conviction 
(Gesinnungsethik) and political responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). He analyzed them 
(in a structural analogy with Marx’s concept of “commodity fetishism”) as the result of the 
penetration of capitalistic-rational material pressures into most spheres of individual and 
social life. In this regard Weber used the metaphor of the “iron cage of bondage” (eisernes 
Gehäuse der Hörigkeit) of economic rationality (Weber 1921: 63). And in connection he called 
attention to the unloosening of the original unity of liberty and politics, the result of which, 
in his opinion, was the economization of the ends, a specific pushing away of human liberty 
(the causality of freedom in the Kantian sense) into irrelevant areas of life (Weber 1922: 133). 
Weber’s analysis of the pressures of instrumental rationality and economic calculation 
as general patterns of behaviour in capitalist society was built upon by conservative thinker 
Carl Schmitt with his concept of the present as an “epoch of neutralization and depoliticiza-
tion” (Schmitt 1940: 120–133). In his opinion, after theology, science, the absolutist state, 
and so on, economics and later technology became “new centres of social life”, whose 
“immanence”, which truly is completely “neutral” and merely “an instrument and weapon”, 
that “serves everyone” and is “culturally blind”, which enables universal connections and 
the ability to rule everything, but at the cost of a special manner of simplifying things. “The 
technology of power,” according to Schmitt, begins to replace politics, or more precisely it 
“decentralizes” and “neutralizes it” (Schmitt 1940: 127).
Many ideas and values, which earlier had served as the most general code for express-
ing group needs and class interests in society (humanity, moral equality, social justice, 
democracy, etc.), were marginalized and took on ever more limiting instrumental attributes 
(“identity democracy”, “national democracy”, “people’s democracy”, and, for example, 
Putin’s contemporary “sovereign democracy”).
We encounter Weber’s key signature of politics for the twentieth century, as something 
spread out between “conviction” and “responsibility”, again in the 1950s in the USA in rela-
tion to the necessity of maintaining the balance of power. At the time, an explicit thesis about 
“the end of politics” appeared as well, particularly about the end of foreign policy, as a result 
of limited possibilities under the circumstances of the “Cold War” and the contest between 
“East” and “West”, which simplified how the world was viewed as well as how it was spa-
tially arranged. Politics came to be ever more frequently replaced by or subjected to expert 
decision-making in the public sphere, borne by instrumental rationality, calculating aims, and 
the means of rational choice.5
5 Let us recall those manifestations of the “end of politics” that were discussed at the time: the limita-
tion of strategic possibilities in negotiating as a consequence of developments in military technol-
ogy; the binding of freedom of political decision-making and the removal of elemental differences 
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“Politics has come to its end”, it was claimed, because bureaucrats, experts, and the tech-
nocrats of power, economists and journalists, and above all politicians themselves – in short, 
everyone who plays on the field of politics – had allegedly suffocated politics, as they bound 
it with strict rules of calculation (of purposes and risks), of the balance of power, and of 
mutual acceptance, as well as by compensating for the interests of power (see the behaviour 
of the West during the Hungarian Revolution or the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia –
sanctions, of the type imposed today, would never have occurred to anyone). 
Conservative cultural criticism of politics
Today we encounter most frequently what is called “a-politics”. Generally, this attitude 
involves the overall rejection of politics, that is, it is based on inaction and disinterest in the 
public sphere, distrust in politics and the possibilities it offers, and may be motivated by pop-
ulist criticism of “those above” and their corruptness, or by elitist distancing from mass col-
lectivism, mediocrity, and the inadequacy of politics. Here convictions of the incompetence 
of politicians and the ineffectiveness of politics, of the abstract emptiness of political pro-
grammes, and the unprincipled nature of coalition agreements rule. 
The term “apolitics”, or more precisely “apoliticalness”, is perhaps the best way to label 
the most general current tendency. Lowered voter turnout is considered a European-wide 
sign of this trend. In 1975, on the national level in Western Europe 85 % of voters went to 
the urns; in 2012 only 75 % of eligible voters turned out. In Central Europe the decrease has 
been even more dramatic. In 1991 voter turnout was 72 %, a figure that dropped to just 57 % 
on the national level in 2012. In the Czech Republic the numbers are even more stark, par-
ticularly in turnouts for senate and EU elections, and in many cases in municipal elections as 
well, where turnout fluctuates at around 30 %. Decreasing voter turnout is becoming more 
prevalent among the less educated. 
There are several reasons for this trend; here, some of them can at least be outlined: 
–  a loss in the penetrating power of political solutions has occurred due to their relativ-
ization (within coalitions) against the platforms of individual political parties;
–  fear of manipulating expectations has grown; 
–  centralized power and politics has lost contact with the day-to-day life of ordinary 
citizens;
–  the social structure of European societies has changed (the breakdown of class-based 
society, the rise of new professional groups);
–  mass characteristics of life have expanded (in the Czech Republic this includes 
the breakdown of “First Republic” society after World War II and after 1948 as a result 
in group, class, professional (and so on) interests to the arguments of experts; the mere compensa-
tory character of political realism; the disappearance of political ethos and leadership qualities; 
lobbyism and lowered voter participation; the ideologizing of ideas during campaign season and 
the subsequent neutralization of these ideas in opportunistic-pragmatic action; interdependence 
between parties and voting blocs, and so on.
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of totalitarian interventions in the social structure, etc., party purges at the onset 
of normalization, etc.); 
–  consciousness of belonging to a particular social class has weakened, as has con-
sciousness of local, professional, and group identity (the breakdown of “class” con-
sciousness, social, cultural, and regional origins); 
–  tension between social interest and political choice has grown; 
–  a horizontal restructuring of society has occurred (with the advance of urbanization); 
–  structural changes in political organization as a result of the weakening or direct break-
down of nation states, which emerged in the nineteenth century and bore the unified 
interests of the political and economic elite, a group that in the globalizing economy 
has begun to fall apart.
“Apolitical” attitudes, which put group interests, private needs, and individualized activities 
(see, for example, the effects weather and second home ownership have on voter turnout) 
above public interests, are today regularly manifested, particularly in principled non-partici-
pation in elections, or the casting of a protest vote, as well as in complaining about politics. 
These phenomena are relatively widespread, but nonetheless have not had any contact with 
intellectual “apolitical” arguments.
The potential of “apolitics” is fundamentally oriented towards the non-civil, and the fre-
quently held belief that only one political truth exists is usually also undemocratic. To general-
ize, it could be said that those who are “apolitical” are those who criticize politics but do not vote 
and who consider utilizing civil society for change as a form of naiveté, careerism, or elitism. 
Thomas Mann, for example, gave this “apolitical” attitude a socially acceptable form in 
his reflections on the causes and consequences of World War I, collected in his Betrachtungen 
eines Unpolitischen [Reflections of an Non-political Man] (Mann 1919), in which he antici-
pated later arguments of conservative and individualistic criticism of the basic convictions 
and concepts of the West (in the sense of a cultural entity, not a geographic locale) and even 
questioned the basic function of politics – in the sense that for him a presupposition of politi-
cal action is mere activism and the irrational desire for change, impatience, and disrespect for 
a historically developed life order and for cultural values, the maintenance of which he con-
sidered to be most important. 
Mann’s culturally critical defence of the non-political man as a cultural actor grew from 
his “patriotic” distancing from the phenomena of the emerging mass society and mass cul-
ture, which Mann referred to with terms that are from today’s perspective confusing: democ-
racy, bourgeoisie, the West, civilization, and so on. In his opinion, in them disappeared “every 
distinction between that which involves an individual and that which does not” (Mann 1919: 
451). Western society, which according to Mann is dominated by the bourgeoisie – he men-
tions England and France in particular – is in his opinion anathema to both the spirit and cul-
ture. Democracy, revered in these places, represented for him the one-sided domination of the 
social sphere and the “Herrschaft” of politics over life and culture. And for him, politics itself 
meant a “minimum of competence” (Mann 1919: 291) because it is constantly being replaced 
more and more by mere voting. To Mann it seemed the situation was fake and unbearable 
“when the supraindividual is confused with the social, or when it is misplaced completely 
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within the social: thereby one ignores the metaphysically supraindividual; for it is the person-
ality, not the mass, that is the most special carrier of the universal” (Mann 1919: 232). And in 
his opinion this also involved the existence of the nation, which – as opposed to “humankind 
as a mere sum of individuals” – is a similar “metaphysical creature” and a bearer of culture, 
whose “value, dignity, and charm [...] definitely emerge from what distinguishes it from oth-
ers” as well as “from what all nations have in common, mere civilization” (Mann 1919: 232).
“The domination of the political”, which according to Mann barbarically endeavours to 
integrate spirituality with politics, needs to be avoided; to do so every artistic, and in particu-
lar every “spiritual act”, must take a principled stand against the political-social sphere (Mann 
1919: 236). The “non-political”, however, was not just something negative for Mann: “I do 
not want a parliamentary and party economic system that devastates all life with politics [...] 
I do not want politics. I want objectivity, order, and decency” (Mann 1919: 246; similarly pp. 
232, 451).
We can construe Mann’s criticism of politics at the end of World War I as an “ideal 
type” of apolitical attitude, which we can still encounter today in some conservative and 
neo-conservative circles, where the shared experience of the nation, the settled values of its 
coexistence, the legality of the existing order, and the productivity of its structures contrast 
with politics as a loosening sphere of civic duty and activism, stemming from the abstrac-
tions of society and endeavouring for social and systematic changes in the name of develop-
ment, modernization, the needs of new institutions, and the rise of marginalized groups and 
the legitimacy of their demands. To adherents of apolitics, Europeanization and globalization 
may seem to be threats similar to the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century. Distrust in the 
possibilities of politics and the demands to limit it just to the execution of power, sovereignty, 
and the maintenance of a framework of values is therefore often connected with distrust in 
the possibilities of, or even the existence of, society as a distinct sphere of interests and needs 
between the individual and the state, as we encounter in Baroness Thatcher’s famous thesis 
that “there is no such thing as society; there are individual men and women, and there are 
families”, or in the statement of French prime minister Éduard Balladur (1993–1995): “I am 
an apolitical person”.
The possibilities of grounding in the pre-political sphere: “non-political 
politics” and “sub-politics”
In the late-twentieth-century Czech Republic, the concept of “non-political politics” was 
debated at length, out of historical perspective, and with little understanding. This concept 
drew only from the writings and speeches of Václav Havel, particularly those that emerged 
during normalization, with no regard for the historical traditions of Czech politics. At the 
same time, this term was often used as a synonym for “a-politics”, or it was superficially 
identified with the more general issue of civil society, moreover inaccurately interpreted as 
the ideology of the “third way” between capitalism and socialism. It was, however, over-
looked that the issue of civil society had been, since the time of the Scottish Enlightenment 
(A. Ferguson, A. Smith, and J. Millar), a legitimate component of all reflections on the socio-
political dimensions of the capitalist organization of political economy and on their value 
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assumptions – frugality versus luxury, productive industriousness versus corruption, respect 
for performance and respect for society-wide viewpoints, fair play, the validity of contracts, 
and so on. Since the mid-eighteenth century interpretations of the term civil society were 
strongly linked to the increasing entrenchment of the capitalistic way of life and the stabiliza-
tion of its values (urbanity, rationality, democracy, progress, civil equality, etc.). 
The issue of “non-political politics” emerged in the nineteenth century amongst the 
Central European stateless nations struggling for emancipation (Czech, Poles, etc.), that 
is, nations that for various reasons had been denied the possibility of expressing their own 
national, economic, and foreign policy interests. In the Czech lands T. G. Masaryk expounded 
upon this term, following the contemporary debate. He combined the Polish idea of “organic 
work for the nation”, which was developed in the later third of the nineteenth century after 
a failed uprising, with Havlíček’s idea of “small acts for the nation”, and he promoted both 
with the generally human ideas of justice, political and civil equality, democracy as a lifestyle 
and humanity as the inner tie that binds, if possible, all human activities together.
Opposed to the Young Czechs’ nationalist liberalism, which was unproductive as far as 
values are concerned but nonetheless found long-term success (and which after the Velvet 
Revolution returned in spectacular fashion), in the term “non-political politics” Masaryk 
emphasized the party-transcending unity of civil interests and society-wide values: education, 
responsibility, mutuality, honour, industriousness, and open-mindedness. At the same time, he 
viewed it as a means of cultivating the political sphere, as well as for improving civic self-
consciousness and political literacy. Another important idea for Masaryk was that “non-polit-
ical politics” within the multinational monarchy established a more general framework and 
context for political endeavours for a national life, or more precisely, for the life of society 
as a whole. In this regard, this orientation of “non-political politics” is an important cultural 
assumption and precondition for “political politics”, or more precisely, “party politics”. 
For example, in Česká otázka [The Czech Question] Masaryk wrote: Czech politics must 
cease being just “politics”, [...] it must be based on deeper, more universal cultural work, it must 
be the practical application of political education and education in general. But this education 
never existed and still does not. Czech politicians must [...] be able to, for the affairs of the nation, 
utilize all the benefits of the steady progress of modern science (Masaryk 1895: 168, 181). 
Rejecting false ideas of Czech historicism based on forged medieval manuscripts, 
against illusions about the greatness and permanence of the national substance, and particu-
larly against compensatory nationalism6, which emerged from these forgeries, Masaryk saw 
in “non-political politics” possibilities for new forms of socializing the nation and building 
the Czech identity. It was to become another means for relating day-to-day life to more gen-
eral principles, and especially for expressing more long-term political interests. It should be 
pointed out, while resisting the possible ideological temptation that arises from there, and 
which was applied in some of Masaryk’s later theses contained in Světová revoluce [World 
Revolution], that the Czech rise is in its own way paradigmatic, that it melts into general his-
torical progress and is “interweaved into world history”. 
6 For more on this, see the penetrating interpretations of Czech politics in Loewenstein (1997).
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Today, the question may be asked, whether or not “sub-politics” or more specifically 
a plurality of “life politics”, can be considered a special form of non-political politics. The 
authors behind these related concepts, recently deceased German sociologist Ulrich Beck and 
British sociologist Anthony Giddens, use them to reject the traditional tension between “pri-
vate and public”; “sub-politics” for them occurs outside of parties and parliaments: in public, 
within movements, in communities, in specific places, and in small groups, which does not 
mean that it has no influence.7
Both authors share in common an attempt to restore the concept of “the political” on 
a new foundation and with new intentions and above all new subjects; in some ways this is 
reminiscent of Ferguson’s afore-mentioned idea of civil society, stationed above mere com-
mercial society, or in the given case above partisan politics. At its core is the decentralization 
7 The term “sub-politics” comes from Ulrich Beck; Anthony Giddens works with the phrase “life 
politics” (Giddens 1992). These authors reject pessimistic analyses of the present stemming from 
misunderstanding ongoing changes, and which proclaim the insignifi cance or even the end of many 
sociologically relevant categories (the subject, family, childhood, work, history, class, politics and 
nature). With Giddens the forms of “life politics” are connected to his concept of modernity as an 
institutional transformation, where the label of modernity “refers to modes of social life or orga-
nization which emerged in Europe from the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently 
became more or less worldwide in their infl uence” (Giddens 1990: 1). Characteristic of Gid-
dens’s concept is its emphasis on the discontinuous “nature of the development of modern society” 
(Giddens 1990: 4) and its potential to disintegrate, manifesting in differentiation, fragmentation, 
and mechanic political unitarianization, which was supposed to compensate for this breakdown. 
Thus, Giddens, along with Beck, within the social sciences, thematized, in a non-relativist manner, 
the new form of contemporary social and cultural changes. He noted that these changes usually 
happen faster than culture and society can respond with a more permanent form of institutional 
stabilization (as well as the stabilization of values) (Giddens 1992: 26–27). Simply put, moderniza-
tion results in transformations that occur at such a tempo that they usually seem to be discomfort-
ing and incontrollable. Therefore, “modernization” according to Giddens can be characterized as 
the permanent disembedding of old institutions, values, norms, attitudes, behaviours, orientations, 
and so on, as well as that which has relatively recently settled into the sediment of culture, and 
simultaneously as a complementary process of constant attempts at re-embedding changes that 
have occurred, or more precisely of institutionalizing them in the form of new values, norms, 
attitudes, behaviours, orientations, etc. This has created for society and the forms of its cultural as 
well as social cohesion a confusing and in many ways risky situation, which, of necessity, activates 
the need for refl ecting these changes, and the position of science in this refl ection. The overall 
culmination of the ideas of the Enlightenment in the form of a “second modernity” should turn to 
new present-day challenges, this is, primarily to the issue of the risk associated with action and 
decision-making and imagining their often unwanted side effects. The identifi cation of new social 
phenomena and thematic fi elds of this “second modernity”, such as the sweeping individualization 
of modes of life, is related, in addition, to the fact that in the end only partial solutions are found for 
universal problems; individualization is at the same time complementary to the creation of a new 
“world society”. It is the consequence of economic globalization, of the similarities between needs 
and interests, and of the intensity of communication, all of which supposedly tends towards tradi-
tional ideas of the state and nation. 
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of ideas of economic necessity, the questioning of the superficial delegation of political 
rights, and the weakening of the centralized execution of political power. 
From this new sociological perspective (implicitly focused against reducing politics to 
power and economics), questions of the relationships between “trust”, “expertise” and “risks” 
come to the forefront. Accompanying this are new demands (1) on creating the epistemo-
logical foundations of knowledge in modern society, (2) on analyzing the possibilities and 
ways for institutionalizing changes and, last but not least, (3) on reconsidering the relation-
ships between political power and professional expertise in the realm of practical activities 
(Giddens 1992: 18). Therefore, with respect to similar demands, Giddens (along with Beck) 
speaks about “reflexive modernization” (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994)8, which is a concept 
that, unfortunately, I cannot address here; I can perhaps only mention that it is the starting 
point for the thesis on the necessity of rediscovering politics as a sphere of rational decision-
making, in which aims, means, and risks come into confrontation, and the permanent reflec-
tion of similar decisions, in which a new qualitative role must be played by science and its 
reflection of the “unwanted side effects” of political decision-making and its risks.
ANO’s anti-politics
On first sight, so-called anti-politics seem to hold a complementary position to the older 
a-politics. Recently, the former seems to be clearly on the rise, as demonstrated in the Czech 
Republic by the successful election results of the Úsvit přímé demokracie party [Dawn of 
a Direct Democracy] and the ANO Movement [YES Movement].9 “Anti-politics”, however, 
8 The term “refl exive modernization” was coined by Ulrich Beck and originally referred to an 
unpreconceived and convincing diagnosis of the present, and later a supposedly “unfi nished project 
of the modernization of modernity” through permanent refl ection (Beck, Bonβ and Lau 2001). It 
is based on the idea that today developments, changes, and innovations occur more rapidly than 
society (and politics) can institutionalize these changes (in the form of laws, norms, and rules) and 
enable people to clearly gain their bearings and to act without problems. As opposed to traditional 
modernity both of these proponents of “second”, “other”, or “refl exive” modernity reject pes-
simistic analyses of the present, stemming from misunderstanding changes, and which proclaim 
the insignifi cance or even the end of many sociologically relevant categories (the subject, family, 
childhood, work, history, class, politics, and nature). Instead of refl ecting on the disintegration 
of original social structures and old ways of life, refl exive modernization attempts to study how 
modernization occurs, what are its effects, and what are the possibilities of institutionalizing these 
effects in new forms of social life. In connection to similar refl ections on the nature of moderniza-
tion, “refl exivity” has a special quality of “double” feedback – in the sense that stakeholders in 
change (modern humankind) are also observers and analysts (who guide their actions based on the 
results of refl ecting on consequences and attempt to avoid the risks that are related to their actions 
and decisions). Here, scientifi c objectivity gains a new position in place of vague ideologies, and 
professional expertise becomes a necessity.
9 The rising trust of voters in the potential of technocratic-managerial “anti-politics” for political 
reform seems to indicate two things: (a) growing scepticism of the ability of partisan politics to 
resolve corruption scandals and to create an environment aversive to corruption, and (b) distrust 
in the ability of parties to deal with economic and social problems. For the time being, it remains 
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is certainly not interchangeable with “apoliticalness” – that is, with disinterest in “affairs 
political” and public – nor with “non-political politics” as the “pre-political” sphere of civil 
activity, of cultivating the public, of demands for political literacy and culture, and so on. 
Anti-politics feeds off of public and intraparty scandals, the abuse of power, and 
attempts “to sweep things under the carpet” – in short everything that makes political action 
and decision-making discreditable and opaque; its means are a simplifying vision of the 
potential of running the state technocratically or like a business. 
A “democracy of legitimacy”, in which political expression is permitted only for “legiti-
mately elected parties” (German president Richard von Weizsäcker in this regard criticized 
“party democracy” as limiting public initiatives), and which in the Czech Republic Václav 
Klaus quite unilaterally advocated, should take into consideration only the interests and needs 
of the victorious party, its members, clients, and perhaps even its voters. It got stuck up on the 
things it was trying not to see: corruption scandals, growing from blindness and ignorance as 
well as from the incapability of rationally analyzing and predicting “unwanted” and gener-
ally long-term “side effects”, which were the results of one-dimensional, inconsistent, and not 
uncommonly often personal interests and decisions (which are nonetheless strongly imposed 
through power and not brought up for discussion with the opposition). Self-confident and 
arrogant ways of ruling can elicit antipathy even when they bring success in economics 
and foreign policy, as recent developments in Poland attest.
Reactions may be “conservative” or “national” utopias (as in Poland and Hungary), or 
“anti-politics”, which seems to be an analogous development in the Czech Republic. The 
fundamental performative paradox of “anti-politics” (when in the end it is necessary to do 
something different than that which is said) consists in the fact that it rejects politics in its 
current form, but at the same time it self-consciously works within its existing structures and 
with its mechanisms. “Anti-politics” takes a critical, even disapproving, stance towards exist-
ing forms of politics, towards the ways in which the interests of voters are represented, and 
towards the mechanisms for delegating their power, but at the same time takes advantage 
of and works with them. It questions the existing separation of powers as well as the political 
legitimacy and, particularly, the abilities of established and “privatized” parties; nonetheless, 
it is forced to negotiate with them as if it was one of them. 
In practice, “anti-politics” is marked by an emphasis on professional competence in run-
ning ministries, objectivity in negotiations, and pressure to increase the role of experts in run-
ning the state, as well a new intensity in advocating purely economic aspects of state man-
agement, which are based on instrumentally rational decision-making, the consequences of 
which in many cases can be socially and liberally problematic. 
In general, three versions of “anti-politics” can be distinguished: (a) intellectual human-
ist, (b) populist, and (c) managerial-technocratic. All three work in a similar way, although 
not resignedly so, as is the case with “apolitics”, with the idea of elected politicians having 
undecided, and in a longer-term perspective uncertain, whether “anti-politics” will revitalize or 
bury parliamentarism, democratic rule, and the liberal culture of rules. Much depends on ANO 
itself (as well as Úsvit), but much also depends on whether its own voters manage to say “no” to the 
anti-politics of the ANO movement in time. 
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minimal competences, with criticism of the low effectiveness and partisanship of advocated 
interests, and with pointing out corruption in decision-making as well as the overall ideologi-
cal and manipulative character of political thinking. The principle of discussing and negoti-
ating interests politically is replaced by a calculating, instrumental rationality, and political 
problems are removed rather than dealt with; in some cases representative democracy in gen-
eral is called into question. 
An example of (a) “intellectual anti-politics”, mostly drawing from criticisms of civili-
zation and culture and from “apolitics”, as it was described, can be found in the writings of 
the interesting Hungarian writer, essayist, and cultural critic Gyorgy Konrad. Here, its indi-
vidualistic base rests on the conservative conception of individual autonomy in the suppos-
edly general situation of civilization involving the historical-social tension between the power 
of the spirit and the power of the state. In this sense questions of the possibilities and meaning 
of intellectual distance from politics are posed in every totalitarian or authoritarian social sys-
tem, most intensively in culturally and politically divided post-World War II Europe. 
The heart of Konrad’s anti-politics was the search for radically different possibilities 
for action and decision-making, ones that would not accept the official (that is, “real social-
ist”) politics and artistic program of the ruling party, but which would at the same time not 
succumb to political resignation. Konrad’s anti-politics therefore had to be in principle radi-
cally personal and private and was – as Konrad repeatedly emphasizes – “the viewpoint of 
a victim” (Konrad 1987: 17), an individual’s search for possibilities in a situation that he or 
she did not cause. Konrad did not want to formulate programs without attempting to lead 
or “socialize”; for him anti-politics was a personal attitude and therefore impossible in any 
group form, as it did not involve the polis, but just the individual and his or her freedom and 
independence, his or her protection from political restrictions and mass serfdom. Its means 
were “self-protection through civil society, nonviolent resistance, insistence on personal dig-
nity and freedom, opposition against the hypertrophy of the state as well as against the mili-
tary and police apparatus, and resistance to revolutionary rhetoric, a means for constantly 
supporting central power. Therefore, a (political) vanguard could not be recruited” (Konrad 
1985: 8) from anti-politics, nor could an artistic avant-garde. Instead it was more the basis for 
creating a cultural network of groups of friends and free associations. It was focused against 
standardized elements of language used in expressing the power of the socialist regime. For 
anti-politics “the independent use of basic terms and a refined solidarity with those who were 
pointed in the same direction” (Konrad 1987: 19) were important. According to Konrad, only 
on such grounds could a “non-pandering culture and creative independence emerge” (Konrad 
1985: 202). All adherents of anti-politics are of course dissidents, since for them what is at 
stake is self-protection of the civil bourgeoisie individual against the all-powerful state; he 
emphasizes however that this individual always “thinks differently than other dissidents”, for 
“he is no representative but just a guardian of the power of the spirit” (Konrad 1985: 209). 
Here politics was fundamentally and clearly subjected to culture, in both the broadest 
sense and as a means for cultivating individual and public space. 
(b) Tomio Okamura’s Úsvit přímé demokracie is an example of “populist anti-politics”, 
unreadable in its interests and intentions, undifferentiating in its means (direct democracy 
being an end in itself), featuring a populist distrust of formal and informal institutions. In 
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restitution schemes that have grown old and simplified, Úsvit is questioning the as-of-yet 
fully settled institute of the political system. With its one-sided calls for introducing refer-
endums, this movement is attempting to change the constitution instead of finding political 
solutions to specific problems. The idea that the greatest sum total of public opinion will 
lead us to effective and responsible governance is perhaps just as absurd as claiming that 
maximizing information will make us wiser. A side-effect of “populist anti-politics” is the 
tendency towards the “implosion of institutions”, towards their internal destabilization as 
a result of battles over power, careers, and prestige, a problem that I cannot focus on here. 
It is indicative of things that this movement was recently affected by a similar “implosion”.
The populist worship of the referendum and the mere opportunistic expression of prob-
lems is a long-term distraction for Úsvit politicians, which affects their role in finding politi-
cal solutions to specific problems and social conflicts. If they truly wanted to enhance the 
culture of direct democracy, they would focus primarily on increasing funding for education 
and make a stand for improving the quality of public broadcasting and of public supervision 
of the media in general. 
(c) Although the illusion of the all-powerful referendum will continue to attract a certain 
segment of voters, the influence and functioning of Andrej Babiš’s technocratic-managerial 
“anti-political” movement ANO will probably be much more important. This movement self-
consciously challenges existing politics and its system and actively questions it. 
This movement is in many ways just as unreadable as Okamura’s Úsvit, in terms of 
power ambitions and organization, as well as in the nature of the interests it wishes to advo-
cate, and even in the personal qualities of its representatives. In many respects both move-
ments can possibly be seen as similar in their marginalization of democracy as a search for 
public interest, which is considered to be given and invariable. They also share in common 
a distrust of the traditional organization of political life and checks on politics, which is 
presented as an institutional innovation reviving democracy. In the case of ANO it is com-
pensated for with the illusion of the power of technocratic solutions and the productivity of 
managerialism. 
But in the case of ANO, the managerial conception of politics does bring some small 
benefits to how ministries are run. That which – besides the above-mentioned general char-
acteristics – may connect this approach to practice is on the one hand improving profes-
sional competences in running ministries, conspicuous objectivity, and the directness of 
action, as well as the potentially growing role of experts. Today purely economic aspects of 
state management are being promoted stronger than ever. They are founded on ends-based, 
rational decision-making, all of which may have many socially problematic effects. We may 
also consider it important that the turbo-speed rise of ANO has stimulated a public debate 
about the differences between the managerial approach to running companies and the demo-
cratic management of interests and governing society, and that it has helped the Czech pub-
lic see more clearly how and why it is necessary to clearly differentiate between politics and 
managerialism. 
The unclear internal organization of ANO results in a vagueness to the structure and 
distribution of power within the movement, to the diversification of competences, as well 
as uncertainty of the principles that bind its positions together; concrete responsibilities and 
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checks on the automatic interweaving of the influence and success of its functionaries are 
also unclear. For the time being, these act as independent, punctual energies of varying out-
put, which may or may not lead to activities that lead in different directions or refute each 
other, and subsequently to a loss of support, to the disintegration of the movement, or even to 
the demise of the coalition. The danger of sliding into more populistic approaches, which in 
traditional parties is weakened by their more transparent structure, may for the time being be 
prevented in ANO by its repeated emphasis on professionalism and competence, even though 
this emphasis too has been put into practice with varying levels of convincingness and inten-
sity in appointing people to various positions.
We might be curious how long and to what effect members of ANO who hold high polit-
ical office can claim to be separate from politics and even repeat that they are not actually 
politicians but managers. It would be in the interest of democracy if they instead focused their 
endeavours on strengthening faith in politics rather than on building up their own credibility 
as an opposing force to politics. Just as with other terms (for example “lobbying”), we cannot 
expect a cleaning up of political activities without actually rehabilitating the term itself. In 
other words, the preconceived stigmatization of politics significantly complicates the clean-
ing up of real politics.
To briefly summarize the above, it is clear that we cannot really speak about a “disap-
pearance of politics”. Rather, it is necessary to thematize the asymmetry between the objec-
tive growth of the significance of politics in the context of changes in today’s historical-
political constellation (the new global distribution of influence and power and the related 
weakening role of “nation states”, the demographic crisis and migration, post-modern and 
multicultural relativization of values, etc.) and between the unsatisfactory practices of politi-
cal actors, unrealistic expectations of their recipients, and particularly the enduring inability 
to reflect the change in the political environment at all levels, on which up until now politics 
has relatively uniformly and monolithically imposed itself. 
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